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The state of comparative law could not be more different between
the United States and Europe. In Europe, Abo Junker observes:
“Whoever today advocates turning one‘s view across borders—
“to substitute a global for a national horizon”—can be sure of
broad approval. He is riding a mighty wave of the Zeitgeist.”1 But
in the United States, Alain A. Levasseur despairs, “[O]utside the
realm of some U.S. law schools, the relevance of comparative law
is almost non-existent, which is really a euphemism for ‘nil’.”2 Despite lifetimes of labor by distinguished comparativists such as
Max Rheinstein, Rudolf Schlesinger, John Hazard and others living and deceased, the United States persists in legal isolationism.3
In this contribution we discuss some explanations of this phenomenon.

I. The Problem Of Comparative Law in the U.S.A. Today
1. The Present State of Comparative Law in the United States
The United States pays comparative law no mind. Judges, as Alain
A. Levasseur demonstrates, virtually never consider foreign legal
“Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagenfach,” 1994 Juristenzeitung 921. Translations are the author’s.
2 “The Use of Comparative Law by Courts (II),” 42 Am. J. Comp. L. Supplement 41
(1994).
3 The conflicts scholar, Ernest G. Lozenzen of Yale, seems to have been one of the
first writers to use the term “legal isolationism.” Book Review, 54 Yale L.J. 886
(1945). (“Now that we have at long last abandoned our political isolationism, the
legal profession must awake to the fact that our law has been bogged down by
an attitude of legal isolationism. Our new position in the world makes it imperative that we become better acquainted with other legal systems. We cannot properly maintain our leadership if we remain ignorant of the legal order under
which other countries live.”) See also Hessel E. Yntema, “Comparative Legal
Research, Some Remarks on ‘Looking Out of the Cave’,” 54 Mich. L. Rev. 899
(1956).
1
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materials.4 Legislators and administrators do not commission
comparative studies of law such as are commonly conducted in
connection with legislation in Europe.5 Even in the universities,
comparative law is literally dying out; few legal academics engage
in serious comparative law studies.6
Comparative law has less importance in the United States
today than it did a generation ago, and, indeed, less than it did in
much of the nineteenth century.7 While there has never been a
golden age of comparative law in America, Basil Markesinis notes
that central European émigré scholars did achieve “phenomenal
success” in the 1950s, and 1960s when they made comparative law
a “recognized, even admired, topic at a time when there was
Supra note 2.
One recent example: all the proposals for “civil justice reform” of recent years
essentially ignored foreign examples. See Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner,
“Civil Justice Reform in the United States—Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civilized’ European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?”, 42 Am. J. Comp. L.
147, 154 (1994).
6 If our assessment seems too dismal, the reader may consult: Alain A. Levasseur, supra note 2; P. John Kozyris, “Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and New Technologies,” 69 Tulane L. Rev. 165, 177 (1994)
(influence described as “minimal” and “marginal”); John Langbein, “The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the U.S.”, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 545 (1995) (“The
study of comparative procedure in the United States has little following in academia, and virtually no audience in the courts or in legal policy circles.” );
Mathias Reimann, “The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject,” 11
Tulane Eur. & Civil L. Forum 49, 52 (1996) (“A Subject on the Margin … interest in
the subject is very limited among both faculty and students.”).
7 The nineteenth century’s most important American jurists—Story, Kent and
Field—were intimately familiar with the Civil Law and advocated its study. See,
e.g., Joseph Story: “There is no country on earth which has more to gain than
ours by the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence. … Let us not vainly imagine that we have unlocked and exhausted all the stores of juridical wisdom and
policy.” Progress of Jurisprudence, Address Delivered Before the Suffolk Bar at
their Anniversary September 4, 1821, at Boston, reprinted in The Miscellaneous
Writings of Joseph Story 198, 235 (1852). See also James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures 15 (1794) reprinted in 2 American Political Writing
During the Founding Era 1760-1805, at 936, 945 (1983); David Dudley Field, Democratic Review, April 1844, reprinted in 1 Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous
Papers 491 (1884). For the influence of civil law ideas on 19th century American
law, see, inter alia, Mathias Reimann (ed.), The Reception of Continental Ideas in the
Common Law World 1820-1920, 89, 91 (1993); Stefan Riesenfeld et al., in 37 Am. J.
Comp. L. 1-184 (1989) (special issue).
4
5
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really little practical need for it.” Unfortunately, he laments that it
“flounder[s] at a time when a shrinking world needs it more than
ever.”8 The émigré generation retired decades ago and is reaching
its twilight years. Even before its retirement comparative law began a decline in the United States. Whitmore Gray has pointed out
that in the 1960s the money stopped, the interest stopped and the
faculties turned to domestic problems.9
2. Globalization and the Future of Comparative Law
In its ignorance of comparative law, the United States stands close
to alone among its principal trading partners. Because of global
and regional forces—known now colloquially as “globalization”—
its trading partners are paying comparative law more and more
mind. This is obvious in Europe, where the Single Market is becoming a reality through harmonized legislation attainable only
after thorough comparative law studies. It is obvious in the
emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, where foreign examples figure prominently in drafting new laws.
“Globalization” is a defining concept of our time. Globalization is a recognition that the societies of the earth are not separate, hermetically-sealed units, but one. More than anything else,
the collapse of communism and with it the artificial division of the
world into competing camps has contributed to globalization. The
development of the Internet and its improved possibilities for
global communications will help speed these developments. For
law, globalization may spell the reversal of that development of
national codifications of the nineteenth century that meant the end
of a common law of Europe and the development of national sciences of law.10 Laws may increasingly become more global.

The Gradual Convergence: foreign ideas, foreign influences, and English law on the eve
of the 21st Century 8 (1994).
9 “Teaching the First Generation of Global Lawyers, Address to an AALS MiniWorkshop January 1993,” reported in Newsletter of the American Foreign Law Association, Spring 1994, 5.
10 Cf. Reinhard Zimmermann, “An Introduction to German Legal Culture,” in
Werner F. Ebke and Matthew W. Finkin, Introduction to German Law, at 7 (1996).
8
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U.S. comparativists familiar with the East Bloc were quick
to see the opportunity for comparative law created by the demise
of communism. John N. Hazard and Wenceslas J. Wagner in their
optimistic preface to the report of the U.S. contributions to the
XIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative
Law observed already in 1990:
An era of democratization is dawning. Since
the XIIth Congress of Comparative Law, held in
Australia in 1986, much has happened. Fresh winds
are blowing on every continent. … New models for
government are being sought. Comparisons between legal systems are being made in the search
for satisfying relationships between state and citizen and between citizen and citizen.
Comparative lawyers with broad understanding of cultures, politics, and economics are in
demand.11
Their insights have proven true—elsewhere—but not in the
United States.
To be sure, globalization has caught fire in the United
States. Everyone talks of it, lawyers included. Law firms are now
global law firms. U.S. firms compete with each other to open foreign offices. While reaching out for world business, the organized
bar has reached out sincerely to assist the emerging democracies
of the former Soviet Union through its “CEELI” (Central and
Eastern European Law Initiative) program. The law schools have
joined in the globalization. Scores of them have programs
abroad.12 Law schools’ internal magazines proudly announce to
their alumni how the law school is going global.13 One law school
38 Am. J. Comp. L., Supplement iii (1990).
Brenden Kirby, “A National Geographic Summer,” National Jurist, January
1996, lists more than 100 programs in some 39 countries.
13 E.g., “Preparing International Leaders for the 21st Century,” Georgetown Law
Res Ipsa Loquitur, Fall 1996; “Cornell: An International Law School,” 23 Cornell
Law Forum 3 (March 1997); “Europe 1992,” Wake Forest University School of Law
Jurist, Spring/Summer 1991; “Connecting the World to the Classroom,” Washington University Law School Magazine, Spring 1993.
11
12
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now even calls itself, “The First Global Law School.”14 Dozens of
law schools maintain their own international law journals; some
even have two!
There is, however, an element curiously lacking in the
globalization of U.S. law: comparative law. U.S. law firms that
open foreign law offices employ U.S. and foreign lawyers, but
rarely encourage their U.S. lawyers to learn foreign law. The
CEELI program, for all its commendable efforts, has something of
a missionary-to-the-savages appearance in the little attention it
seems to have given the indigenous legal cultures. U.S. common
law institutions are not likely to take root in the republics of the
former Soviet Union, whose legal systems are rooted in the civil
law.15 U.S. law schools send their students abroad, gladly accept
foreign students, but do not “globalize” their own faculties, which
remain decidedly mono-cultural when it comes to knowledge of
foreign legal systems.16 The numerous law school international
law journals rarely include serious comparative law work.17 Law
school programs that bring foreigners to the United States to teach
them about the U.S. system and ignore foreign systems are reminiscent of the British imperialism nascent in the Rhodes’ Scholarship Program. 17a
3. Why Comparative Law Matters
We lament that comparative law is unimportant in the United
States when elsewhere it is of great importance. Some readers
might disagree and assert that comparative law is of little importance. While we think that the importance of comparative law
“The First Global Law School,” NYU The Law School Magazine, Autumn 1994;
“Special Issue 1995: The Global Law School Program,” NYU The Law School
Magazine, 1995.
15 See Ernst C. Stiefel, “Von der Berufung deutscher Juristen zum Aufbau des
Rechts im Osten,” 1994 Juristenzeitung 109, 110.
16 Whitmore Gray, supra note 9.
17 See Eric Stein, “Uses, Misuses—and Nonuses of Comparative Law,” 72 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 198, 214 (1977).
17a The first sentence of the first book produced by the “Global Law School” is:
“The importance of American Law in today’s world cannot be overstated.” Editor’s Preface, New York University School of Law, Fundamentals of American
Law, v (1996).
14
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ought to be self-evident18—and it probably is to most contemporary European lawyers—, we pause here to mention briefly three
of the most obvious, most practical and most important uses for
comparative law in the United States:
•

Foreign law is important for U.S. business. The United States
does business around the world. In that business, it encounters
other legal systems. U.S. business needs to know about the
foreign laws it encounters.

•

Still more important is that U.S. law is not perfect. Even its
most ardent advocates concede that. The United States could
find in foreign legal solutions answers to problems it presently
faces. The United States could adopt the foreign solution or, in
the interest of world-wide harmonization of law, seek to reach
a solution that works for all legal systems.

•

Perhaps most important is that comparative law provides
critical perspective on U.S. law. Without the benefit of comparative law the United States cannot well measure it own
law.19

18 Cf. P. John Kozyris, supra note 6 at 167 (1994) (“utility of the comparative
method is beyond dispute”).
19 Americans and Europeans alike have long recognized the value of perspective.
For example, Calleb Cushing, who later became U.S. Attorney General, observed
in 1820: “[I]t is by comparison of our rules and practice with those of foreigners,
that we become fully sensible of what is defective or excellent, and therefore of
what is to be cherished and upheld, or to be disapproved and abolished in our
institutions. Nothing more inevitably checks improvement than a jealous or contemptuous rejection of foreign, and an over weening admiration of domestic
habits, customs, and principles.” “The Study of the Civil Law,” 11 North American Review 407, 408 (1820). Gustav Radbruch, in simple strong words in 1946 in
the wake of the Hitler catastrophe, wrote: “What in the law is fleeting and what
eternal becomes most vividly clear through comparison..” “Erneuerung des
Rechts,” in 3 Arthur Kaufmann, Gustav Radbruch Gesamtausgabe 80 (1990)
(emphasis in original). To the same effect, see also Rudolf Schlesinger, Book Review, 37 Cornell L.Q. 120, 124 (1951); Young B. Smith, Dean of Columbia University School of Law School, quoted in Francis Deak, “The Place of Foreign and
Comparative Law in the American L. Rev.s,” 23 Va. L. Rev. 22 (1936); Pierre LePaule, “The Function of Comparative Law,” 35 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 858 (1922), reprinted in Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Rechtsvergleichung 63,
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Only the most short-sighted of lawyers would allow comparative
law to flounder and die in the United States. Instead, every rightthinking lawyer should endorse the comparative study of law.20

II. Reasons why U.S. Lawyers are not Learning from
Comparative Law
An understanding of reasons why U.S. lawyers are not learning
from comparative law is helpful in considering the obstacles to
changing that condition. In this contribution we suggest some
possible reasons. Our enumeration is neither comprehensive nor
empirically grounded. The reasons we discuss fall into four broad
classes:
•
•
•
•

lack of necessary skills;
lack of institutional support for systematic comparative law
work;
legal structures that resist comparative law influences; and,
an attitude that there is little to learn from foreign law.
1. Lack of Skills and Skilled Persons
a. Lack of Foreign Language Skills

Lack of foreign language skills is an apparently simple matter, but
one of enormous importance for comparative law in the United

82 (1977). See generally for many current statements along the same lines from
around the world, Peter Gilles, Prozeßrechtsvergleichung 105-12 (III.4: “Ziele und
Zwecke, Leistungen und Nutzeffekte der Prozeßrechtsvergleichung”) (1996).
20 Comparative law in the sense in which we are advocating it here requires studies that cross the common law—civil law divide, if not the Western, non-Western
line. True comparative studies should not be limited to purely Common Law
jurisdictions. Thus a comparison of rules of descent in U.S., English and French
law would satisfy us, while the same comparison limited to U.S. and English
rules would not.
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States. Most U.S. lawyers—indeed most educated Americans—are
monolingual.21
Max Rheinstein called attention to the importance of proficiency in foreign languages for comparative study of law. He felt
that every English-speaking comparativist should have thorough
knowledge of at least French or German and preferably both, in
addition, possibly, to other languages.22 The need of a comparativist for foreign languages is obvious: a jurist limited to English is
limited to secondary sources if he or she wishes to read about the
civil law. Detlev Vagts put the handicap succinctly: ignorance of
foreign languages limits the lawyer’s ability to “penetrate foreign
legal systems.”23
It is understandable that most Americans do not study foreign languages to the point of proficiency required for comparative law work. America is a huge continent and there is little reason at home to know foreign languages. Abroad, everyone—or so
it sometimes seems—speaks English. In many cultures, even limited knowledge of a foreign language brings commercial rewards.
Not so in the United States, where even proficiency is apt not to be
rewarded at all. So, as a result, few Americans study foreign languages and fewer still study foreign languages to the level of proficiency required for comparative law. In fall 1995, fewer than one
in ten of all Americans enrolled in post-secondary education—just
about 1.1 million students total—was enrolled in a foreign lan-

21 Compare John H. Langbein, supra note 6, at 547 (“A background factor of
great importance is the weakness of foreign language knowledge even among
the most able and highly educated of American lawyers.”).
22 “Comparative Law—Its Functions, Methods and Usages,” 22 Ark. L. Rev. 417,
424 (1968), reprinted in 1 Max Rheinstein—Gesammelte Schriften 251, 259 (1979).
Rheinstein no doubt advocated French and German because those are the languages of the two sub-traditions generally regarded as leading the Civil Law
world. See Ugo Mattei, “Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual leadership in
Western Law,” 42 Am. J. Comp. L., 195, 200 (1994).
23 “Editorial Comment, Are There No International Lawyers Anymore?,” 75 Am.
J. Int’l L. 134, 135 (1981). See also Hessel E. Yntema, supra note 3, at 906-07 (1956)
(“But for the study of law, a central part of human culture, no such modicum of
linguistic preparation is expected—not even for appointment to a law faculty. …
[T]he percentage of those who in this essential respect are qualified for comparative legal research has become exiguous indeed in the United States .”).
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guage course.24 Moreover, Americans studying foreign languages
disproportionately concentrate on Spanish: the number of students studying Spanish far exceeds the number studying French,
German, Italian, Russian, Chinese and Japanese combined.25
The lack of foreign language skills, however, has an even
more detrimental effect on comparative law than simply depriving the country of scholars able to do comparative work. The lack
of language skills marginalizes comparative law work.
Lack of knowledge of foreign languages reduces the audience for comparative law work. Someone with even limited familiarity with a foreign language is more likely to be open to reading in his or her own language about a foreign system conducted
in that language than is someone who has no familiarity with the
language at all. With the text in the mother tongue at hand, the bilingual reader may be emboldened to investigate some aspect of
the foreign system on his or her own. It is hard to imagine the recent “reception” of U.S. law in Europe26 were English not so
widely known, or for that matter, the reception of Roman law in
Europe had not Latin been widely known then.
More invidious than the lack of an audience is that lack of
foreign language skills can lead those without foreign language
knowledge to regard scholarship requiring that knowledge as peripheral and even to denigrate those who have that knowledge.
Alan Watson pointed out this phenomenon: “the scholars do not
have the tools for the job; hence the job can’t be worth doing.”27
William H. Honan, “Language Study Shifts Again: Chinese Is Up, Russian
Down,” New York Times, October 9, 1996, B9 (reporting the results of a survey of
the Modern Language Association of America).
25 1995 approximate enrollments: Spanish 606,000, French 205,000, German
96,000, Japanese 45,000, Italian 44,000, Chinese 26,000 and Russian 25,000. Id.
26 Regarding the “reception” of American law in Europe, see Wolfgang Wiegand,
“Die Rezeption amerikanischen Rechts,” Festgabe zum Schweizerischen Juristentag
1988, Sonderband 124 of the Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 229 (1988);
Wolfgang Wiegend, “The Reception of American Law in Europe,” 39 Am. J.
Comp. L. 229 (1991) and Rolf Stürner, “Die Rezeption U.S.-amerikanischen Rechts
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Festschrift für Kurt Rebmann 839 (1989).
27 Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, A Case Study in Conflict of Laws 96 (1992).
Further: “ It is not that scholars in legal history are lazy: it is only that foreign
languages and foreign law are not part of their basic training and seem peripheral.” Id. at 97.
24
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Does this mean that comparative law is actually unwelcome? Will
a law journal that does not have the foreign language power necessary to conduct the compulsory cite check be as open as one was
recently and admit that,28 or will it simply reject the submission?
We recall receiving back a draft book review from one law journal
stating that it had already published reviews of enough books in
foreign languages.
b. Lack of Individuals Skilled in Comparative Law
Closely related to the shortage of language skills is the resulting
shortage of individuals sufficiently skilled to conduct comparative
law research. This absence was recognized decades ago when the
émigré generation of comparativists began to retire, but nothing
was done.”29 Today, the shortage of qualified comparativists is
more acute than ever. P. John Kozyris noted:
High-level legal work cannot be done without
comparative study, and America has a serious lack
of human resources in this field. The great comparativists of the eighteenth century who shaped
American law in its formative years, such as Story
and Kent, are long gone. Moreover, the generation
of expatriates from Hitler's Germany and Central
Europe, such as Rheinstein, Ehrenzweig, Rabel,
Schlesinger, Riesenfeld, and Stein, who enriched

28 For example, one review prefaced an article with the note “The author of this
Article was able to translate German sources into English. Unfortunately, The
Pace International L. Rev. is unable to verify these sources. Thus, we are relying
on [the author’s] translation, which we trust to be accurate.” See Thomas
Swenson, “The German ‘Plea Bargaining’ Debate,” 7 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 373 n.*
(1995).
29 See “The Present State of the Science of International Law in the United
States—An Address by R.R. Baxter Delivered on 13 November 1976, during International Law Weekend [New York City],” reprinted in Michael H. Cardozo,
The Practical State of Teaching and research in International Law 1974, at 6 (1977).
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the American legal scene, is fading away and successors are hard to come by.30
The reasons for this serious lack of human resources are fairly easily identified. Serious comparative law work requires, as Max
Rheinstein emphasized, serious preparatory work. One does not
learn one’s own legal system overnight; years are required. A
similar attention to the project is necessary for a U.S. lawyer seeking to learn how foreign lawyers think. Max Rheinstein was explicit: he thought two years of study of a foreign system the
minimum.31 We agree. The first year is necessary to understand
the system as system to be able to place the individual objects of
study within that system. Thorough and systematic study of two
legal systems is characteristic of the careers of the best comparativists.
Unfortunately, few tenured law professors or partnered
practitioners have the time to spend two years studying a foreign
legal system. If there is a time in one’s career when this can be
done, for most lawyers it is at the outset of their careers. At that
time, however, there are many competing considerations: paying
off student loans, attractive offers, etc.
The present reward system of U.S. law does not, however,
encourage recent graduates to do this. Neither the U.S. academic
world nor the U.S. practice world values foreign legal study in the
slightest. (It is different abroad.)32 The international legal exchange between the United States and Germany, Mathias Reimann noted, has been largely a “one-way-street”.32a The academic world and, to a lesser extent the practice world, values one
and only one kind of “post-graduate” project: the judicial clerkSupra note 6, at 178 (1994).
Supra note 22.
32 Cf. John Engle in The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 17, 1995 (“It is not an
exaggeration to say that nearly everywhere but in America foreign study is considered to be a vital element of higher education, worthy of intelligent scrutiny
and public support.”).
32a “Abschied von der Einbahnstraße,” Address given for the Thanksgiving
Program of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Juristen-Vereinigung (DAJV), Nov. 23,
1996, reported in Cordula Woeste, “Gedanken zum Ausbau der deutschamerikanischen Studienbeziehungen,” 22 DAJV-Newsletter 20 (1997).
30
31
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ship. However one values clerking with a trial or appellate judge
for learning about the U.S. judicial process, one certainly has to
regard it as of extremely limited value for learning about foreign
legal systems. Yet, that is the principal alternative career development path open and, with respect to an academic career, increasingly essential.33
2. Lack of Institutional Support for Comparative Law Study
a. Comparative Law Institutes
The shortage of skilled comparative law researchers might be
quickly remedied were there sufficient institutional support for
such work. Institutional support is essential for comparative law
work just as it is for work in any other area of concentrated, systematic research. The ideal situs for such work might well be independent research institutes such as are found in other areas of
scientific endeavor. Then one would not have to look to legal
practitioners, who are paid by clients, or to law faculty who are
paid for teaching, to conduct comparative law research. Ernst
Rabel thought that Germany, by creating comparative law institutes, had “filled a gap that neither law schools nor law firms
could close.”34 Such an institute can bring together jurists from
many different legal traditions and produce scholarship that no
single jurist could ever hope to accomplish alone. A half a century
ago, Rabel called for creation of such a U.S. institute of comparative law along the lines of the present Max Planck Institutes, i.e.,
an institute composed of 15 or more professional members inde-

See Robert J. Borthwick and Jordan R. Schau, “Note: Gatekeepers Of The Profession: An Empirical Profile Of The Nation's Law Professors,” 25 U. Mich. J.
Legal Reference 191, 212 (1991) (“… the percentage of professors teaching today
who began teaching in the 1980s and who completed clerkships is more than
twice the percentage of professors who clerked and who were hired in the
1960s.” at 214 ).
34 Ernst Rabel, “On Institutes for Comparative Law,” 47 Col. L. Rev. 227, 230
(1947), reprinted in 3 Ernst Rabel—Gesammelte Aufsätze 235, 238 (1967).
33
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pendent of any university.35 P. John Kozyris recently renewed
Rabel’s call for a U.S. institute of comparative law:
We have national endowments for the humanities,
the arts, and the sciences, so why don't we have a
National Endowment for Law and Justice? Under
the auspices of this endowment, an American Institute of Comparative Law (Institute) could play an
important role by injecting wisdom from abroad
into our understanding of policy choices and policy
implementation in the United States. In addition,
the Institute could become the main source for information on foreign laws and experts, providing a
service of increasing value to legal practitioners.
The Institute is only a dream, so let us make it a
dream worth having, which means that it would be
adequately funded and able to attract the best and
the brightest comparative law minds from home
and abroad. In the alternative, these functions
could be dispersed among two or three existing
workshops of comparative law, such as the EasonWeinmann Center, provided that the public funding is adequate and long-term.36
Continued funding is a major obstacle to such a comparative law
institute in the United States and it is not likely that we will see
such an institute in the foreseeable future.
b. Comparative Law in U.S. Law Schools
Since we do not expect Professor Kozyris’ dream to be fulfilled in
the United States any time soon, we would like to believe that the
best hope for comparative law study is to be found in the law
schools. At first blush, the health of comparative law in U.S. law
schools seems good. Membership in the institutional organization
35
36

Id.
Supra note 6, at 178 (1994).
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that sponsors the American Journal of Comparative Law is at an all
time high. Dozens of law schools sponsor programs abroad; dozens sponsor journals of international and comparative law. Yet, as
John Langbein has pointed out, this masks a “Potemkin Village.”
While many courses may appear in catalogues, “virtually nobody—only a handful of students—actually takes these courses.
The vast majority of U.S. law students graduate in complete ignorance of comparative law.”37 The pages of U.S. law reviews are
practically devoid of the work of serious comparative law scholars.38 The law school that has enthusiastically and systematically
supported comparative law study is the exception.
The present precarious state of comparative law in U.S.
law schools is probably a by-product of larger forces at work in
U.S. law schools. For a long time, U.S. law schools have been torn
between competing professional and academic missions. More
recently, they have experienced turmoil as new forms of scholarship have challenged past ways of doing things.
Richard Stith has observed the “extraordinary educational
distance between the two sides of the Atlantic” in legal education.39 Where the civil law professoriate is “deeply imbued with
an academic ethos,” the U.S. law school world is “strikingly different[:] … legal study is often called ‘professional’ rather than
strictly ‘academic’.”40 Unlike Europe, where law was always a
central part of the university, legal education in America grew up
as a substitute for apprenticeship training with lawyers. Initially,
37 Supra note 6, at 546 (1995). Accord, M. Reimann, supra note 6, at 52. Reimann
proposes to change matters by eliminating the “basic course” in comparative law
and substitute “decentralized” teaching of comparative law in substantive law
courses generally. While we appreciate Professor Reimann’s efforts and have
nothing against introducing comparative elements in courses generally, we do
not agree that the Basic Course should be jetisoned. We also believe that the issue of use and non-use of comparative law, even limited to consideration within
the academy, extends well beyond the calculus of how many students register
for courses denominated “comparative law.”
38 One exception is The American Journal of Comparative Law, which is a consistent
source of high quality comparative law work However, many—perhaps most—
of the works it publishes come from abroad.
39 “Can Practice Do Without Theory? Differing Answers in Western Legal
Education,” 80 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 426, 429 (1994).
40 Id. at 427.

16

Ernst C. Stiefel and James R. Maxeiner

law schools to be attractive to their clientele had to provide their
students with a better form of legal training than could be had in
the old apprenticeship system. They were so successful in their
development, however, that they completely drove apprentice
training from the field.41 Today, only university education is required for bar admission; there is no practical training required.
Accordingly, U.S. law schools often respond first to their students
need for training and only second to the needs of legal scholarship. As Michael G. Martinek observed, they provide “Training
instead of education.”42
Comparative legal research has long been a victim of the
“box office”. Since students do not demand comparative law
courses, law schools are not quick to provide them. But since law
schools staff their faculties to teach particular classes and not to
support broader research missions, they have not demanded
comparative law scholars.
Within the framework of the professional school, moreover, law schools can easily satisfy the limited demand that does
exist for comparative law courses. One comparativist at a leading
school wrote us that law schools see no need to add faculty members in the comparative law field, since established faculty “with
virtually no foreign law, language, or cultural background” can
become “instant experts”—at least sufficient for course-teaching
purposes—based on a short week’s visit abroad. Specialized
knowledge is not necessary if all that is required is to offer enough
to permit a law school to say, “check, done that.”
The instant expert would not be satisfactory if scholarship
were a decisive criterion in selection of law faculty, but it is not.43
Unlike in most of the American university, there is no requirement in law schools that professors have completed a doctorate
41 On the history of American law schools, see generally William P. LaPiana,
Logic & Experience, The Origin of Modern American Legal Education (1994); Robert
Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (1983).
See also, Craig Evan Klafter, “The Influence of Vocational Law Schools on the
Origins of American Legal Thought, 1779-1829,” 37 Am J. Legal Hist. 307 (1993).
42 “Der Rechtskulturschock: Anpassungsschwierigkeiten deutscher Studenten in
amerikanischen Law Schools,” 1984 Juristische Schulung 92, 93.
43 See James Gordley, “Mere Brilliance: The Recruitment of Law Professors in the
United States,” 41 Am. J. Comp. L. 367 (1993).
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and have established themselves as scholars. Richard A. Posner
observed that “The essence of most graduate education is not the
courses and the exams, but the preparation for a career in scholarship that is afforded by the experience of writing a dissertation.
Few law professors, even when they are practitioners of the new
scholarship, have that experience.”44 Law professors possess, according to Richard Stith, “not knowledge but intelligence;”45 according to James Gordley they are selected for “mere brilliance.”46
In Europe, as Richard Stith has observed, law is an academic field of study where students aspire to scientific understanding.47 The mission of a European law faculty would seem
fairly clear. According to Horst Ehmann:
The mission of the law faculties is the safeguarding,
improving and further development of the law as
well as the education of future lawyers with the
ideal view of our time in the hope that the students
of these faculties will be able to realize in their professional lives a little bit of the ideal conceptions of
which we can only dream. 48
The goals that we have identified above for comparative law—
knowledge of the laws of one’s trading partners, models for law
reform and perspective on one’s own legal system—all fit quite
easily within that mission.

44 Overcoming Law 101 (1995). The usual requirement is only a J.D., or Juris Doctor, which while styled a doctorate, is not in any conventional sense. All 175 U.S.
law schools combined bestow only a handful of true doctorates in law, the S.J.D.,
each year—less than twenty, typically. Richard Stith, supra note 39 at 428. See
also Robert J. Borthwick and Jordan R. Schau, “Note: Gatekeepers Of The Profession: An Empirical Profile Of The Nation's Law Professors,” 25 U. Mich J. Legal
Reference 191, 212 (1991) (noting the sharp decline in the last generation of new
law professors with advanced degrees in law).
45 Supra note 39, at 428.
46 Supra note 43.
47 Supra note 39, at 427.
48 “Die Aufgabe der Zivilrechtslehrer,” in Juristische Fakultät der Universität
Trier (ed.), Die Aufgabe der Juristenfakultäten, Festgabe für Otto Theisen, 11, at 34
(1996).
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The world of the U.S. law school is quite different. Even
though the last generation has seen a departure from the professional orientation of U.S. law schools toward what Richard Posner
terms the “new scholarship,” it remains a world quite different
from the European law faculty. It is a world beset by turmoil.49
Beginning with the so-called Legal Realists, U.S. law schools have
whole-heartedly endorsed social science work and have promoted
interdisciplinary studies such as are typical of the law and economics, critical legal studies, feminist law and critical race theory
schools.50 Critics such as Richard Stith have observed that “if the
Realists have largely failed to bring serious social theory into U.S.
law schools, they have succeeded in driving out most serious legal
theory.”51 Few today would deny the decline in the more traditional forms of legal scholarship that focus on doctrine. Richard A.
Posner observed that “[d]octrinal scholarship has been in relative
decline for many years, having been abandoned by many law professors, especially young ones and especially at elite law
schools.”52 According to Alan Watson:
To an extent unparalleled elsewhere, students are
not exposed to systematic treatment of law, with
clear-cut concepts, institutions, and rules, but are
presented with individual cases, outside of a his49 See generally Richard A. Posner, supra note 44, chapter 2 (“The Triumphs and
Travails of Legal Scholarship”) (1995); Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers, part III (“The Lamp of Learning”) (1994).
50 Critical Legal Studies in particular creates something approaching consternation for some foreign observers. Alexander Somek, Professor at the University of
Vienna, notes that “most of the cls trademarks, such as ‘trashing’ or ‘deconstruction’ would appear to German scholars to be something threatening, dangerous,
or indeed, nihilistic.” “Lecture: From Kennedy to Balkin: Introducing Critical
Legal Studies from a Continental Perspective,” 42 Kan. L. Rev. 759, 764-65 (1994).
See also Gerard Quinn, “Legal Theory and the Casebook Method of Instruction
in the United States,” in Micheál Ó Súilleabháin (ed.), Legal Theory and Cases:
Shifting Frontiers 9 (1994).
51 Supra note 39, at 434.
52 Supra note 44, at 84. Posner notes that Judge Harry T. Edwards has spoken
eloquently of “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession,” 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992), which has led to a decline in “practical”
scholarship. Judge Edwards’ article was the subject of a symposium issue of the
Michigan L. Rev., August 1993. See 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921 (1993).
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torical, doctrinal, legal context but against a background of social interests. Since this is the culture
of U.S. scholars involved with law, and since it is
hard to see the culture one lives, they take for
granted that this is the way law does develop everywhere and at all times. They greatly underestimate the role of doctrine and of a purely legal culture.53
There is little place in that world for comparative law.
Comparative law scholarship, which was probably the first
field of legal scholarship to recognize the importance of historical,
political and cultural factors, now seems quaintly old-fashioned to
some adherents of the new scholarship because of its heavy reliance on legal science and doctrine. Historical conceptions of comparative law—both in the United States and abroad—view law as
a “science”.54 This is science not in the limited sense “science” is
most frequently used in the United States, namely of an empirical
science along the lines of physics or chemistry, but science in the
broader European sense of an organized body of knowledge, such
as in the German sense of Rechtswissenschaft.55 Eduoard Lambert,
one of the French leaders of comparative law, spoke of the “science of comparative law.”56 As recently as 1976 Richard R. Baxter,
Supra note 27, at 118 n. 29. But see Ugo Mattei, “Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law,” 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 195 (1994) (noting American intellectual leadership in law promoted, in part, by its the distance of American legal scholarship from authoritative texts).
54 See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, supra note 3, at 903 (“comparative law is another
name for legal science”).
55 See generally David S. Clark, “Tracing the Roots of American Legal Education—A Nineteenth Century German Connection,” 51 Rabels Zeitschrift 313
(1987). This was the view held in early nineteenth century America as well. See,
e.g., Daniel Mayes, “Whether Law is a Science,” 9 Am. Jurist 349 (1833).
56 “Conception génerale et définition de la science du droit comparé, sa méthode,
son histoire; le droit comparé et l’enseignement du droit” (1905), reprinted in
Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Rechtsvergleichung 30 (1977).Cf.
Edouard Lambert, “Comparative Law,” 4 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 126,
129 (1931) (“comparative jurisprudence and law as a social science are two aspects of the same thing”); M. Schmitthoff, “The Science of Comparative Law,” 7
Cambridge L.J. 94 (1941).
53
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late U.S. Justice on the International Court of Justice, was not embarrassed to speak of “The Present State of the Science of International Law”.57 Today, however, we are informed that “the typical
law faculty person would only laugh” at the idea of a science of
law.58 According to Richard Stith, U.S. law students “never even
hear that word.”59
An important part of the science of comparative law—
though by no means the only part—is the careful exposition of
foreign doctrine or, black letter law, if you will.60 But today that
part is under direct attack. William Ewald published a booklength critique of contemporary comparative law that in large
measure is addressed toward what he sees to be comparative
law’s weakness: too much attention to doctrinal matters.61
John Langbein has directly connected disdain for doctrine
to the sad state of comparative law: “Th[e] instinctive disdain for
other legal cultures derives in part form the intellectual movement
known as legal realism, a movement that has, since the 1930s,
strongly devalued the doctrinal integrity of American law.”62
Lawyers and academics that are skeptical of doctrine are not likely
to have much interest in comparative law with its implicit
searches for the common core concept or the “better” solution. If
57 “The Present State of the Science of International Law in the United States—An
Address by R.R. Baxter Delivered on 13 November, 1976,” supra note 29.
58 This was a remark in 1996 of a retired comparativist at a leading law school.
See also, Paul D. Carrington, “Legal Education for the People: Populism and
Civic Virtue,” 43 Kansas L. Rev. 1, 36 (1994) (to the effect that medicine is a science, while law finds its role in politics). For Europe, see, e.g., Konrad Zweigert
& Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 45 (2d revised ed. 1992) (“What
we must aim for is a truly international comparative law which could form the
basis for a universal legal science.”)
59 Supra note 39.
60 Joachim Zekoll, “Kant and Comparative Law: Some Reflections on a Reform
Effort,” 70 Tulane L. Rev. 2719, 2725 (1996) ( “Those who engage in comparative
legal studies traditionally pay close attention to the text of foreign and domestic
law. This should not come as a surprise, for the attempt to explore a normative
system requires an exposition of its components, and the descriptive element
inherent in this task is of basic importance.”).
61 William Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a
Rat?”, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, 1896 (1995). For a pointed response, see Joachim
Zekoll, supra note 60.
62 Supra note 6 at 551.
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law is politics, well, why bother studying foreign examples? As
usual, Langbein made his point with punch: “If you have been
trained to view legal doctrine as a pack of feeble or even dishonest
excuses, excuses masking the real interests and forces that underlie and explain the work of the courts, you will not have much regard for the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch and for the style of legal reasoning that it embodies and fosters.”63
3. U.S. Legal Structures Resist Comparative Law Influences
a. U.S. Law-making Methods Leave Little Room for Comparative Law
Although the United States may have entered an “era of statutes”,64 U.S. law-making is still dominated by common law thinking. Common law thinking and law creation are not be receptive
to comparative law, whether the law making takes place in the
context of judicial decision or legislation.
Insofar as judges make law, there is relatively little room
for comparative law. Case law deals with authoritative points and
does not seek to create a rational system; it is not abstract. In litigation, the initial search is for binding precedent: the decision of
the court superior to the one determining the case. If that can be
found, no law-making is necessary. Obviously, a superior court’s
decision does not involve comparative law. If no superior court
decision is found and judicial law making becomes necessary, the
law making involved is interstitial, that is, the judge is only filling
in the “gaps.”65 Again, there is no obvious role for comparative
law.
Even when the United States turns to legislation, however,
the form of its legislation is not generally conducive to comparative studies. Its pragmatic approach to legislation means that it
tends to legislate about like it decides cases: one particular point at
63 Id. Compare David Fraser, “The Day the Music Died: The Civil Law Tradition
from a Critical Legal Studies Perspective,” 32 Loyola L. Rev. 861 (1987)”.
64 Compare Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).
65 See James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust
Law: A Comparative Study 30-31 (1986); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process 113-14 (1921).
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a time. The United States prefers to minimize legislation and disperse the authority for it.
When U.S. lawyers think of forward-looking legislation,
they normally think of one of three forms of legislation: federal
legislation, “Restatements of the Law,” and uniform state legislation. Restatements of the law, by their nature, offer the least room
for comparative law example. A restatement is supposed to “restate” the law with only a gentle motion to reform of law; that
does not allow room for major departures from prior practice.66 In
most instances, the only room for comparative law might help to
choose the “better” solution from several options, but that would
only where the comparative example would fit right in. Unfortunately, uniform state legislation does not offer substantially better
opportunities for comparative work. Uniform legislation, to be
effective, requires that most of fifty different state legislatures
adopt the same law. That requirement is not conducive for substantial departures from existing law and practice; the political
exigencies require an appeal to that which we already have. That
leaves federal legislation.
Federal legislation, even if it did not have similar political
problems of acceptability for adoption that uniform state legislation has, would still have the basic problem of common law skepticism of legislation. It faces the strong U.S. preference for pragmatic, particularistic solutions. The United States simply does not
choose to legislate abstract systems, but prefers to solve very particular problems. A striking example of this is the U.S. approach to
data protection. While the principal trading partners of the United
States now all have so-called omnibus statutes that apply to personal information generally, the United States legislates such protection only on what is called a sectoral or industry-specific basis.67 Thus the United States has strong protections for personal

66 See Hessel E. Yntema, “The American Law Institute,” in Max Radin & A.M.
Kidd (eds.), Legal Essays In Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray 657, 660 (1935); see also
James Gordley, “European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties,” 81 Col. L. Rev. 140 (1981).
67 See Paul Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, “Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Privacy
Sector,” 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 499 (1995) (arguing that “U.S. standards derive from
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information contained in consumer credit reports and for video
tape rental records, but little protection for medical records.
b. Comparative Law Invites Law Reform which Offends Vested Interests
One of the virtues of comparative law is that it challenges one to
think critically about one’s own legal system. That suggests law
reform and a change in the status quo.68 Machiavelli observed the
obstacles would-be reformers face: “It should be borne in mind
that there is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of
success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating
changes in a state’s constitution. The innovator makes enemies of
all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm
support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the
new.”69
In the case of the United States legal system the forces for
the status quo are particularly strong and well-entrenched. One
observer of the U.S. court system observed: “The central obstacle
to change in the courts is not the resistance to reform, but is, more
fundamentally, the lack of interest in even thinking about
change.”70 There is “a systematic tendency to retain the status
quo.”71 The forces behind the status quo have the advantage that a
legal system is a highly technical structure. Laymen are not wellsituated to reform it; but they, who have the knowledge to reform
it, have vested interests in not doing it.72 As one critic who noted
how well lawyers are doing within the current system put it, they

the influence of American political philosophy on legal rule making and a preference for dispersed sources of information standards”).
68 See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, “Reflections of a Migrant Lawyer,” in M. Lutter,
Ernst C. Stiefel & M.H. Hoeflich (eds.), Der Einfluß deutscher Emigranten auf die
Rechtsentwicklung in den USA und in Deutschland, 487, at 490 (1993).
69 The Prince, translated by G. Bull.
70 Malcolm M. Feeley, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail: A Twentieth
Century Fund Report 192 (1983).
71 Raymond T. Nimmer, The Nature of System Change: Reform Impact in the Criminal Courts, 176-77 (American Bar Foundation, 1978)
72 Supra note 70, at 196.
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are going to protect “the goose that lays the golden egg.”73 Many
U.S. lawyers have done so very well in that system, that there is
talk of an opulent “litigation industry”74 and of a “Litigation
Gravy Train.”75 According to Professor Mary Ann Glendon, the
United States has become “A Nation Under Lawyers.”76 The hand
of the vested interests is further strengthened by what John Langbein has called the “interconnectedness” of the system, that is,
that all the parts work together as a whole. There really is no such
thing as a “small reform.”77 Hessel E. Yntema pointed out the effect on comparative law of this “powerful complex of vested professional interests.”78
c. The 18th Century U.S. Constitution Hinders Certain System Changes
Opponents of law reform often appeal to the 18th century U.S.
Constitution to frustrate change. Wherever the Constitution controls, change is especially difficult, since amendments to the Constitution are so difficult to produce: they require two thirds majorities in both houses of Congress, consent of the President and
approval by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. Rudolf
B. Schlesinger noted how the U.S. Constitution contains a number
of “positive provisions which, based as they are on common-law
concepts, constitutionalize and thus perpetuate ancient and in
part archaic rules and institutions.”79 Schlesinger identified the
civil jury as a serious instance of such “antiquarian constitutional
rules” impeding law reform.80 The jury as thus perpetuated constitutionally has not been limited to the basic concept of lay participation in legal decision-making, but has extended to specifics of
Robert V. Wills, Lawyers Are Killing America, A Trial Lawyer’s Appeal for Genuine
Tort Reform 8 (1990).
74 Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion 11, 46, 300 (1992).
75 Editorial, “Ending the Litigation Gravy Train,” New York Times, January 21,
1997, at A22.
76 Supra note 49.
77 Supra note 6, at 551-52.
78 Supra note 3, at 900.
79 Supra note 68, at 490.
80 Id.
73
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just what a jury must look like, namely, a panel of purely lay persons, who decide as they wish without providing any legal justification (Begründung), who must be protected from hearsay evidence, whose decision should not be subject to review, etc.81 In
other areas, the United States Supreme Court through interpretation of constitutional provisions, has constitutionalized large areas
of the law, most notably, the law of criminal procedure, thus creating, as Schlesinger observed, “a giant obstacle to legislative reform.”82
4. An Attitude that Foreign Law has Little to Teach: Willful Blindness
Willful blindness is our last reason for U.S. indifference to foreign
law. Amazing as it may seem, many U.S. lawyers simply do not
want to hear about foreign legal ideas. They are convinced—
without examination of competing choices—that their law is better. It is nothing other than the “not invented here” idea. Rudolf B.
Schlesinger observed this phenomenon:
[W]hen it comes to problems of criminal procedure,
[U.S. lawyers and Americans generally] are possessed by a feeling of superiority that seems to
grow in direct proportion to the ever-increasing
weight of the accumulating evidence demonstrating the total failure of our system of criminal justice. In large part, this feeling of superiority is
caused by plain ignorance concerning the details
and even the basic nature of the leading foreign
systems. … This belief, which generates an attitude
of unthinking contempt toward foreign systems, is
200 years our of date.83

See John H. Langbein, “Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental
Alternative Fill the American Need?”, American Bar Foundation Journal (1981).
82 Supra note 68, at 491 (1993). To the same end, Charles Maechling, “Borrowing
From Europe’s Civil Law Tradition”, ABA Journal, January 1991, at 59.
83 “Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience,”
26 Buffalo L. Rev. 361, 363 (1976).
81
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The U.S. legal system enjoys the imprimatur of more than
two centuries of constitutional and democratic development. In
the last century, when the governments of civil law countries were
still debating the merits of popular participation in government,
the United States already had a democratic system. In this century, when America responded to a world-wide depression by
democratic means, civil law Europe fell under totalitarian control.
The legal system enjoys the fruits of the successes of the political
system. A lay observer, Anne Strick, noted that “Among patriotic
fictions rooted marrow-dear is that which equates America’s legal
system with truth and justice.”84 What would the United States,
which has three times in this “American century” saved the world
from tyranny,85 have to learn from these unreliable civil law systems? John Langbein has called this phenomenon the “Cult of the
Common Law”:
The Cult of the Common Law is centered in
that fusion of public and private law that seems so
peculiar to persons trained in European legal systems. My suggestion is that the successes of AngloU.S. public law have given an aura to our courts
and our legal system that protects the system
whenever criticism is directed toward serious
shortcomings in the procedures and institutions
that handle routine matters of private law and
criminal law. Implicit in the Cult of the Common
Law is the contention that the legal system is an indivisible package … and that any tampering with
this complex structure risks the political liberties
that have been historically associated with the Anglo-American legal systems. Expressed in this way,
the Cult of the Common Law is profoundly chauvinistic and reactionary. It seizes upon the relatively precocious development of constitutionalism
84 Injustice for All: How Our Adversary System of Law Victimizes Us and Subverts
Justice 15 (1977).
85 Inaugural address of William Jefferson Clinton, January 20, 1997, New York
Times, January 21, 1997, at A14.
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in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and uses
that as a shield against criticism based on foreign
example. Again and again in discussions about the
shortcomings of the contemporary legal system I
find that when I draw upon foreign example, that I
am met with responses such as, “Before you go on
telling me any more about the virtues of German
civil procedure, please explain why they had Hitler
and we did not.”86
Patrick M. McFadden has identified a similar phenomenon connected with the reaction of U.S. courts to international law which
he calls “Provincialism in United States Courts.”87
The Cult of the Common Law is pervasive if rarely so
crassly expressed as to deprecate foreign law. It is present at the
highest levels of the bar. For example, the President of the American Bar Association in the December 1996 issue of ABA Journal,
after acknowledging problems with the civil justice system, nevertheless wrote: “For all its faults, the American system of justice
continues to be the envy of the world. It’s not perfect, but it works
better than virtually any other system on Earth.”88 It is clearly present wherever Americans see in their system a reference point for
other legal systems as they develop their own legal regimes without considering whether other legal systems might serve as reference points for the American. Moreover, the Cult of the Common
Law is neither new nor limited to less intellectual members of the
Supra note 6, at 554. See also John H. Langbein, “The Influence of the German
Émigrés on American Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure,”
in Marcus Lutter, Ernst C. Stiefel and Michael H. Hoeflich (eds.), Der Einfluß
Emigranten auf die Rechtsentwicklung in den USA und in Deutschland 321, 329
(1993).
87 “Provincialism in United States Courts,” 81 Cornell L. Rev. 4, 5 (1995) (“Over
the past 200 years, United States judges have developed a series of rules and
practices that minimize the role of international law in domestic litigation. Considered collectively, these rules and practices embody a thoroughgoing, deeply
rooted provincialism—an institutional, almost reflexive, animosity toward the
application of international law in U.S. courts.”).
88 N. Lee Cooper, “President’s Message: All We Ask for Is Fairness,” ABA Journal,
December 1996, at 6. Maxeiner’s letter in response is in the February 1997 issue at
10.
86
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bar. An American as profoundly aware of Continental legal ideas
as Arthur L. Goodhart seems to have suffered from it.89
A result of the Cult of the Common Law is rejection of foreign legal ideas without even considering them. Over sixty years
ago Karl Llewellyn counseled Stefan Riesenfeld that to identify a
proposal as based on foreign law was to give it “the kiss of
death.”90 With respect to the recent abortive reform of civil procedure, the one “foreign” proposal seriously considered—the loser
pays rule of England, and most other countries—was rejected
with contempt, but without study. In the ABA’s section journal for
lawyers one reads “The Truth about the “English Rule: “We
should ‘stop, look, and listen’ to the facts about this so-called
Loser Pays Rule before we simply assume that this idea, created in
foreign legal jurisdictions, would beneficially apply to our own
civil justice system.”91 In the realm of criminal procedure, the O.J.
Simpson trial should have shown to even the densest observer—
regardless whether one feels the defendant innocent or guilty—
that the U.S. system of criminal justice is in sore need of reform.
Yet in the ABA Journal one reads that those who would jump to
conclude that the United States might want to consider foreign
solutions are clearly in the wrong.92 One is constantly told, that for
See Carola Vulpius, Gustav Radbruch in Oxford 59 (1995). Goodhart (an American at Oxford) apparently discouraged Radbruch from having his Rechtsphilosophie translated into English and complained that German jurists always seemed
to want to bring their science to England but did not want to make English jurisprudence useful for Germans. Goodhart wrote: “It is because of the uncertainty
of political life on the Continent that these questions have so profoundly affected
legal thought in those countries, and not because, as is sometimes said, foreigners are more capable of philosophical thought than are Englishmen.” “Law and
the State, 47 Law Quarterly Review 118, 121 (1931).
90 Stefan Riesenfeld, “The Impact of German Legal Ideas and Institutions on Legal Thought and Institutions in the United States,” in Mathias Reimann (ed.), The
Reception of Continental Ideas in the Common Law World 1820-1920, 89, 91 (1993).
91 G. Marc Whitehead & Robert B. MacDonald, “The Truth about the “English
Rule”, 21 Litigation 3, 62-63 (1995).
92 E.g., “In the end, viewers’ comments suggest that most people do not understand the adversary system. … Indeed, many people seem to view the justice
system as a pristine search for truth, where lawyers on both sides ought to serve
as assistant truth-seekers. Many people’s comments appear to suggest that they
would be more comfortable, at least in theory, with an inquisitorial [sic] system
based on the European model. … If, however, the legal profession and the organ89
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all the warts of the U.S. system, any alternative would surely be
worse.
III. Comparative Law in the U.S.A.—quo vadis?
The reasons that we have discussed above suggest that there are
very real obstacles to U.S. lawyers learning from comparative law.
We regret to say that we are more pessimistic than optimistic with
respect to whether these obstacles will be overcome anytime soon.
Here is our view how the obstacles we have discussed are likely to
play out in the next quarter century.
•

Americans will not suddenly start learning foreign languages
in appreciable numbers. The best that we feel we can hope for
is that enlightened U.S. law schools will prefer as students and
faculty those rare individuals who are proficient in foreign
languages. But Hessel E. Yntema called for that four decades
ago and few law schools heard him.

•

U.S. law schools are not likely to find a place for comparative
law, a step-child of all of three of the principal conflicting interests that are battling for the soul of U.S. legal education.
Comparative legal research is too doctrinal at a time when
doctrine is out, but neither sufficiently practical nor sufficiently theoretical for proponents of the principal alternatives
to doctrine. Comparative law is on life-support at most U.S.
law schools given their disinclination to bring in new comparativists. One comparativist at a major state university
wrote us that “most of us are happy just to hold our own.” If
no new blood comes in, time promises extinction.

ized bar want the public to be truly informed rather than just inflamed about the
issues in criminal procedure, the educational campaign needs to begin—the one
that will demonstrate that the adversarial system, ugly as it often is to watch, is
not a sausage factory, but the very basis of liberty.” Charles B. Rosenberg, “The
Law After O.J.”, ABA Journal, June 1995.
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•

The U.S. legal system is not going to change its methods of
law-making and substitute scientific legislation. Llewellyn’s
Uniform Commercial Code was more likely an aberration than
a harbinger of the future. While the United STates may turn
more to legislation, it is not likely to build that legislation on
foreign models or utilize studies of foreign law. The United
States is likely to hold fast to its peculiar institution of procedure: the adversary system. The entrenched special interests
will not suddenly give up their power.

•

Americans may persist in a worldview formed in 1945 when
the United States. stood almost alone unharmed by World
War II. Fifty years later even educated Americans seem no less
convinced of the righteousness of their legal and political system and no more willing to accept the necessary idea of comparative law that foreigners might actually have something to
teach. After all, the United States. is still the first choice of the
world’s emigrants. It was the United States. that “beat” the
U.S.S.R. in the Cold War. Such attitudes foster the continued
vitality of John Langbein’s Cult of the Common Law. The best
we hope for is that globalization will gradually change these
attitudes. Until these attitudes are abandoned, we have no
hope that U.S. lawyers will learn from comparative law. So
long as they persist, U.S. law will suffer. U.S. law reform will
be timid and inadequate. Americans will have only themselves to blame: U.S. lawyers’ ignorance of foreign law is no
excuse.

